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Abstract: The present paper seeks to effectively address the following question: What 
Bitcoin looks like? To do so, we regress Bitcoin price on different variables (potential Bitcoin 
fundamentals recorded in the literature) by applying an ARDL Bounds Testing approach for 
daily data covering the period from December 2010 to June 2014. Our findings highlight the 
speculative behavior of Bitcoin. This virtual currency may be also used for economic reasons. 
However, there is any sign of being a safe haven. By considering the Chinese trading 
bankruptcy, the contribution of speculation (proxied by investors’ attractiveness to Bitcoin) 
remains dominant, indicating the robustness of our results.  
Keywords: Bitcoin; ARDL Bounds Testing method; innovative accounting approach; VEC 
Granger causality test. 
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1. Introduction 
Since its creation in 2009 by Satoshi Nakamoto-pseudonym, the Bitcoin has 
experienced multiple peaks and successive ups and downs. Is it a safe haven or a speculative 
trap? Is it a short-term hedge? Is it a long-run promise? The opinions about this nascent 
currency have drawn a substantial attention from investors, advisers and market regulators. 
The fact that questions get frequently and heavily asked indicates the utmost importance of 
this phenomenon.  
Bitcoin is virtual money with zero intrinsic value issued by computer code in 
electronic portfolios, which is not convertible into anything and not have the backing of any 
Central Banks and any government. The value of a Bitcoin cannot be considered as 
convertible tangible asset (such as gold) or a fiat currency (such as dollar). It is determined by 
the interplay of supply and demand. This nascent crypto-currency fulfills various functions. It 
facilitates business transactions from person to person worldwide without any intermediary, 
reduces trade barriers and increases the productivity. Nevertheless, Bitcoin remains far from 
certain for many reasons including the extra-volatility, the inelastic money supply coded by 
mathematic formula and the lack of legal security. Bitcoin is a digital currency in a nascent 
stage closely associated to multiple risks stemming essentially from its volatile and 
speculative behavior. 
Despite its deeper popularity, there still very few works analyzing Bitcoin 
phenomenon. These researches seem insufficient to fully address the huge amount of 
questions around it. For instance, the study of Kristoufek (2013) focuses only on assessing 
whether Bitcoin is a “speculative bubble” by investigating the link between Bitcoin and 
speculation (proxies by investors’ attractiveness). In addition, Glaser et al. (2014) have 
attempted to evaluate if Bitcoin is an asset or a currency. Differently, Kristoufek (2014) has 
tried to investigate whether Bitcoin is more driven by technical, financial or speculative 
factors by applying coherency wavelet. This technique allows it to gauge the interconnection 
between each two variables without considering additional time series that may have “pulling 
role” on Bitcoin price dynamic. In other words, this analysis may be incomplete. More 
accurately, wavelet coherency cannot be considered usually as perfect technique On the one 
hand, it may lead to confuse outcomes since the occurrence of noise cannot be neglected, 
disrupting then the studied relationship (Ng and Chan, 2012). On the other hand, wavelet 
decomposition is generally applied to assess the periodicity and the multiple signals that 
happen over time. Nevertheless, when we consider only two variables in wavelet analysis, we 
generally fall on the problem of simple regression without control variables. This highlights 
the inability of this technique to effectively capture outcomes since it may distort the estimate. 
In that context, Aguiar-Conraria and Soares (2011) argue that the findings change 
substantially when we move from unconditional wavelet investigation (with only two 
variables) for conditional wavelet estimation (by adding supplementary explanatory 
variables).  These findings were confirmed in the paper of Bouoiyour et al. (2014 a), which 
put in relation the exchange rate and oil price in Russia, using wavelet approach. This implies 
that the use of large-scale parameters of each two variables as the case of Kristoufek (2014)’s 
study may yield inconclusive results in terms of the relation between Bitcoin price and its 
main drivers. This reinforces the need to take into account the control variables to confirm the 
obtained findings.  
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Due to the complexity of this new digital currency, the Bitcoin phenomenon demands 
a deeper investigation to elucidate users’ information.  For this purpose, the present paper 
attempts to address several questions: What this crypto-currency looks like? Is it a safe haven 
or a speculative trap? Is it a business income? Is it a short-term hedge? Is it good idea to 
invest in Bitcoin? Is it a long term promise? 
 To find better paths, our contribution to this debate is to effectively answer the above 
questions by carrying out convenient methods. More precisely, we regress Bitcoin price on 
investors’ attractiveness, exchange-trade volume, monetary Bitcoin velocity, estimated output 
volume, hash rate, gold price and Shangai market index by applying an ARDL bounds 
Testing approach, innovation accounting method and VEC Granger causality test for daily 
data for the period 2010-2014.  
By doing so, we show interesting findings: In the short-run, the investors 
attractiveness, the exchange-trade ratio, the estimated output volume and the Shangai index 
affect positively and significantly the Bitctoin price, while the monetary velocity, the hash 
rate and the gold price have no influence. In the long-run, the substantial impacts of 
speculative nature of Bitcoin, output volume and Chinese stock market index observed in the 
short term become statistically insignificant. The effect of exchange-trade ratio becomes less 
strong, while the effects of the monetary velocity and the gold price still insignificant. The 
hash rate explains significantly the dynamic of this new virtual currency. These findings are 
solid and unambiguous since they change slightly when incorporating the dummy variable 
relative to the bankruptcy of Chinese trading company. The inclusion of additional variables 
which have no great influence on Bitcoin price development (oil price, Dow Jones index and 
a dummy variable denoting the closing of Road Silk by FBI) has led to unstable estimates. 
Beyond the nuances of short and long terms, this research confirms the speculative nature of 
Bitcoin and its partial usefulness in economic reasons without forgetting the important role 
that play the Chinese stock market and the processing power of Bitcoin network in explaining 
this phenomenon. Intuitively, this new digital money seems far from being a safe haven and a 
long-term promise. 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a brief literature 
survey. Section 3 describes our data and presents our methodological framework. Section 4 
reports our main results and discusses them. Section 5 focuses on robustness check. Section 6 
concludes and offers some policy implications that may be fruitful for investors and 
regulators.  
 
 
2. Brief literature survey 
Bitcoin has engaged the attention of medias and researchers, acknowledging its 
complexity. Some researchers considered Bitcoin as financial instrument rather than currency 
or payment system. Others called it “evil” since it is not controlled nor by central banks nor 
by governments. Some economists defined it as “a speculative trap” because of its extreme 
volatile behavior (Buchholz et al. (2012), Kristoufek (2013, 2014), Bouoiyour et al. (2014.b) 
and Ciaian et al. (2014)). Others showed that with the absence of effective hedging 
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instruments, this digital money can behave as a speculative bubble (Yermack, 2014). 
Consistently, Glouderman (2014) argue that “economists scoffed at Bitcoin as more of a 
financial experiment than a legitimate payment system. Some economists denounced it as 
evil, because its value is not backed by any government nor can it be used to make pretty 
things as can gold. Others show that with no intrinsic value, Bitcoin’s rising price constituted 
a speculative bubble”.  
The study of Kristoufek (2014) attempts to determine whether Bitcoin is likely to be a 
safe haven, a speculative bubble or a business income by analyzing the potential sources of 
Bitcoin price fluctuations including supply-demand fundamentals, speculative and technical 
drivers. Wavelet coherency has been carried out to assess properly the linkage between the 
considered variables at distinct frequencies. The obtained results reveal that the fundamentals 
such as exchange-trade ratio play substantial roles in the long-run (lower frequencies). The 
Chinese market index seems an important source of Bitcoin price evolution, while the 
contribution of gold price dynamic appears minor and sometimes unclear. He finds also that 
Bitcoin prices are mainly influenced by investors’ interest and thus by the speculative 
behaviors of businesses. This interconnection is the most dominant at lower frequencies 
(higher time scale). Intuitively, the findings reveal that during the explosive prices period, the 
investors’ attractiveness to this nascent currency drives this currency price up, while it drives 
it down during rapid declines period.  
Glaser et al. (2014) have tried to address what intentions are businesses and investors 
following when moving their currency’s usage from domestic ones into a crypto-currency like 
Bitcoin. By applying an Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity model, they show that 
the motivation of investors to Bitcoin and their intention to gather additional information 
about its development has a great effect on Bitcoin exchange volume. Nevertheless, the nexus 
between digital money and users’ interest seems insignificant when considering the volume 
within the Bitcoin system. These observed outcomes may be heavily due to the fact that 
exchange users prefer usually to keep their Bitcoins in their exchange wallet to avoid 
speculation and cyber-attacks without any intention to use them in economic reasons (trade 
transactions, for example). 
Bouoiyour et al. (2014 b) attempt to appropriately evaluate whether Bitcoin is a 
business income or risky investment. They use Granger causality to assess the relationship 
between Bitcoin price and exchange-trade ratio to answer the first question and the link 
between Bitcoin price and investors’ attractiveness to address the second one. These tests 
have been carried out within a frequency domain framework (unconditional versus 
conditional causality) by applying a Breitung and Candelon’s (2006) approach. Their results 
reveal that Bitcoin price Granger-causes exchange-trade ratio in the medium- and in the long-
run. Besides, the investors’ attractiveness Granger-cause Bitcoin price in the short term. These 
relationships change substantially when considering the Shangai index and the hash rate (i.e. 
conditional causality), highlighting therefore the complexity of investigating what exactly 
Bitcoin looks like. Summing up, the focal studied links seem bidirectional and cyclical. These 
cycles can be short, medium or long depending to the directions of causality in question. Their 
research provides insightful evidence by confirming the extremely speculative nature of 
Bitcoin without neglecting its great usefulness in economic reasons. The conditional causality 
through the consideration of the Shangai index and the hash rate appears valuable since it has 
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succeeded to find solid results connecting further Bitcoin to the speculative behavior of 
investors. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
The existing literature on Bitcoin price suggests different factors that may play 
“pulling” roles on the explanation of the dynamic of this virtual currency including investors ’ 
attractiveness, the global macroeconomic and financial indicators and the technical drivers. 
To measure the users’ interest to Bitcoin, we follow Kristoufek (2013) by using daily Bitcoin 
views from wikipedia as it allows us to capture the speculative behavior of investors. In order 
to detect Bitcoin economy, we use two respective indicators which are exchange-trade ratio, 
the monetary Bitcoin’s velocity determined through the Bitcoin days destroyed for given 
transactions and the estimated output volume. Technical drivers have been also considered to 
explain the dynamic of Bitcoin measured via the hash rate available at Blockchain. We 
consider also the global macroeconomic and financial indicators following the studies of 
Ciaian et al. (2014) and Kristoufek (2014) including the gold price and the Chinese or 
Shangai stock market index. Before beginning our analysis, it seems highly important to give 
some details about the variables under consideration: 
- The Bitcoin price (BPI):  The Bitcoin is new digital money that has recently attracted Medias 
and a wide range of people. It is an alternative currency to the fiat currencies including dollar, 
euro and yen, with several advantages like lower transactions fees and transparent information 
about the trade transactions. It has also some drawbacks where the most damageable ones are 
the lack of legal security, the extra volatility and the great speculation (Kristoufek, 2014).  
- The investors’ attractiveness (TTR): To effectively determine the investors’ attractiveness to 
Bitcoin, we can use daily Bitcoin views from Google1 as it able to depict properly the 
speculative character of users (Kristoufek, 2013). Likewise, Bouoiyour et al. (2014 b) have 
chosen to use the number of times a key word search term in relation to this famous crypto-
currency is entered into the Google engine.  
- The exchange-trade ratio (ETR): The trade and exchange transactions expand the utility of 
holding the currency that may lead to an increase in Bitcoin price. The exchange-trade ratio is 
measured as a ratio between volumes on the currency exchange market and trade. It can be 
considered as transactions proxy (Kristoufek, 2014), or to address whether Bitcoin is business 
income (Bouoiyour et al. 2014). 
- The monetary Bitcoin velocity (MBV): By definition, the velocity of money is 
the frequency at which one unit of each currency is used to purchase tradable or non-tradable 
products for a given period. Because of the large daily fluctuations of Bitcoin, the velocity of 
the economy of this new crypto-currency has stayed relatively stable.  
- The estimated output volume (EOV):  Basically, there is a negative relationship between the 
estimated output volume and Bitcoin price, i.e. an increase in output volume leads to a drop in 
Bitcoin price especially in the long-run (Kristoufek, 2014). 
- The Hash rate (HASH): The emergence of Bitcoin has provided new approaches concerning 
payments. Hence, some new words have emerged such as the “hash rate”. It may be 
                                                             
1 The views from Google used here as indicator of users’ interest is determined via the frequency of the online 
Google search queries related to new digital money generally and Bitcoin particularly. Piskorec et al. (2014) 
highlight the great usefulness of this proxy to accurately describe the behavior of Bitcoin investors. 
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considered as an indicator or measure of the processing power of the Bitcoin network. For 
security goal, the latter must make intensive mathematical operations, leading to an increase 
in the hash rate itself heavily connected with an increase in cost demands for hardware. This 
may affect widely Bitcoin purchasers and thus expands the demand of this new currency and 
in turn their prices. Theoretically, the hash rate is associated positively to Bitcoin price 
(Bouoiyour et al. 2014 b).  
- The gold price (GP): Bitcoin does not have an underlying value derived from consumption 
or production process such as the precious metals including gold. Arguably, Ciaian et al. 
(2014) put in evidence that there is any sign of Bitcoin being a safe haven. 
- The Chinese market index (SI): The Chinese market index is considered as the biggest player 
in Bitcoin economy and then it may be a potential source of Bitcoin price volatility. 
Kristoufek (2014) takes an important example that may confirm this evidence, which is the 
development around Baidu that may be considered as important determinant of the Chinese 
online shopping. The announcement that Baidu is accepting Bitcoin has influenced 
substantially the price dynamic of this virtual currency. Arguably, Bouoiyour et al. (2014.b) 
advance that Bitcoin is likely to be a speculative trap rather than business income, but this is 
conditioning upon the performance of Chinese market. 
During the period between 05/12/2010 and 14/06/2014, this study disentangles the 
existence of long-run cointegration between the above mentioned variables without and with 
considering a dummy variable denoting the bankruptcy of Chinese trading company (it 
amounts 1 from 02/2013 and 0 otherwise). All these data are extracted from Blockchain2 and 
quandl3. To improve the precision power of results, we carry out a log-linear specification that 
incorporates TTR, ETR, MBV, EOV, HASH, GP and SI. 
 
tttttttt LSILGPLHASHaLEOVaLMBVaLETRLTTRaaLBPI   76543210      (1) 
tttttttt DVLSILGPLHASHLEOVLMBVLETRLTTRLBPI   876543210  (2) 
 
Where  ,  are the error terms with normal distribution, zero mean and finite variance.  The 
letter L preceding the variable names indicates Log.  Kristoufek (2013, 2014) and Bouoiyour 
et al. (2014) assume that an increased users’ interest searching for information about Bitcoin 
leads to an increase in Bitcoin prices. Then, we expect 0, 11 a . The exchange-trade ratio 
denotes the ratio between volumes on the currency exchange market and trade. Theoretically, 
the price of the currency is positively associated to the use of transactions as it expands the 
utility of holding the currency, increasing then Bitcoin price (Kristoufek, 2014). So, it is 
expected that 0, 22 a . The monetary Bitcoin velocity is measured by taking the number of 
Bitcoin in a transaction and multiplying it by the number of days where coins are already 
spent. Greater is Bitcoin velocity, greater will be Bitcoin prices (Ciaian et al. 2014). We 
expect 0, 33 a . An increase in the estimated output volume affects negatively Bitcoin price 
in the long term (Kristoufek, 2014). We expect therefore 0, 44 a . The hash rate is 
associated positively to Bitcoin price. According to Bouoiyour et al. (2014.b), an increase in 
                                                             
2 https://blockchain.info/ 
3 http://www.quandl.com/ 
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Bitcoin price generates the intention of market participants to invest and to mine, leading to a 
higher hash rate. We expect that 0, 55 a . Kristoufek (2014) reveals that Bitcoin is not 
heavily interacted with gold price. Palombizio and Morris (2012) argue that gold price may be 
considered as the main source of demand and cost pressures and then seems a contributor of 
inflation development and thus affect positively Bitcoin price. We expect 0, 66 a . The 
Chinese market index is considered as a substantial player in digital currencies and in 
particular Bitcoin. According to Kristoufek (2014) and Ciaian et al. (2014), the Bitcoin price 
is correlated with well Chinese performing economy. We expect thus that 0, 77 a . The 
Chinese trading bankruptcy may affect considerably Bitcoin price since Chinese market is one 
of the Biggest Bitcoin market. This event has led to a remarkable drop in the prices of Bitcoin 
(Bouoiyour et al. 2014). Indeed, it is well expected that 08  . 
 
3.1.The ARDL Bounds Testing Method 
The ARDL bounds testing approach introduced by Pesaran and Shin (1999) allows us 
to see whether there is a long-run relationship between a group of variables, some of which 
may be stationary at level, while others are not.  This method has various advantages: First, 
the time series are assumed to be endogenous. Second, it obviates the need to classify the time 
series into I(0) or I(1) as Johansen cointegration. Third, it allows us to assess simultaneously 
the short-run and the long-run coefficients associated to the variables under consideration.  
This paper applies this technique to investigate the relationship between Bitcoin price 
and the aforementioned determinants on the one hand (Equation 1) and by incorporating then 
a dummy variable that denotes the bankruptcy of Chinese trading company on the other hand 
(Equation 2) to check the robustness of our results. The ARDL representation of equations (1) 
and (2) are formulated as follows: 
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Where D  denotes the first difference operator; ','   are the usual white noise residuals. To 
evaluate whether there is a cointegration or not depends upon the critical bounds tabulated by 
Pesaran et al. (2001, pp.300). There is a cointegration among variables if calculated F-statistic 
is more than upper critical bound. If the lower bound is superior to the computed F-statistic, 
we accept the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Moreover, if the F-statistic seems between 
lower and upper critical bounds, the cointegration outcomes are inconclusive. The stability of 
ARDL approach is assessed by carrying out various diagnostic tests and the stability analysis. 
The diagnostic tests include the adjustment R-squared, the standard error regression, Breush-
Godfrey-serial correlation and Ramsey Reset test. The stability of short-run and long-run 
estimates is checked by applying the cumulative sum of recursive residuals, the cumulative 
sum of squares of recursive residuals and the recursive coefficients. 
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3.2.The innovative accounting approach and VEC Granger causality 
The majority of empirical studies on the nexus between macroeconomic variables use 
the standard Granger causality test augmented with a lagged error correction term. 
Nevertheless, this method may be ineffective since it is unable to properly detect the possible 
effects of shocks. To resolve these limitations, we explore an innovative accounting approach 
by simulating variance decomposition and impulse response function. The purpose here is to 
assess whether Bitcoin seems a safe haven, risky investment, business income, speculative 
trap or long-run promise. Using variance decomposition, we decompose forecast error 
variance for Bitcoin price following a one standard deviation shock to investors’ 
attractiveness, exchange-trade volume, monetary Bitcoin velocity, estimated output volume, 
hash rate, gold price and Shangai market index. This technique enables to test the strength of 
its impact on the concerned time series. The impulse response function captures the shock of 
the own series (the focal variable) with others variables in the studied specifications. In an 
effort to identify whether there is a short-run causality between the variables in question, the 
Granger causality/Block Exogeneity Wald tests based upon VEC model may be useful. It 
determines if the lags of any time series does not Granger cause any other variable in the 
system using LM-test. The null hypothesis is accepted or rejected based on chi-squared test 
based on Wald criterion.  
 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1.ARDL results 
To determine the most potential driver of Bitcoin price dynamic and what this crypto-
currency looks like, we start by reporting the descriptive statistics (Table-1). We clearly show 
a substantial data variability, highlighting the very prime need to use robust models. The 
coefficient of kurtosis appears inferior to 3 for all variables (except LTTR, LETR, LMBV and 
LEOV), indicating that the distribution is less flattened than normal distribution. The 
Skewness coefficient is positive for all time series (except LETR and LGP), providing that the 
asymmetrical distribution is preferable. The Jarque- Bera test revealed high and significant 
values, leading to reject the assumption of normality for all the considered variables. 
 
Table-1: Summary of statistics 
 
 LBPI LTTR LETR LMBV LEOV LHASH LGP LSI 
 Mean  3.052919  1.574058  13.41844  15.01983  13.69757  10.83858  7.319273  7.744138 
 Median  2.507972  1.565531  13.32571  14.95729  13.68825  9.846016  7.357317  7.717494 
 Maximum  7.048386  4.804185  18.09288  18.97052  17.10051  18.45453  7.547765  8.022789 
 Minimum -1.480693 -1.033161  4.057230  11.58991  10.64887  4.528026  7.084017  7.568131 
 Std. Dev.  2.078718  0.918618  2.235922  1.019057  1.033003  3.263868  0.120834  0.114295 
 Skewness  0.203586  0.201630 -0.668879  0.116808  0.009475  0.687444 -0.243169  0.761047 
 Kurtosis  2.280162  3.326236  4.017153  3.887130  3.684876  2.922190  1.703855  2.590701 
 Jarque-Bera  21.23110  8.362903  87.78542  26.12393  14.57141  58.86658  59.57174  77.22019 
 Probability  0.000025  0.015276  0.000000  0.000002  0.000685  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 
 
9 
 
Before proceeding ARDL estimation, we determine the degree of integration of 
variables. To this end, we use Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. The results 
are reported in Table-2. We clearly notice that the variables are integrated either at level or at 
first difference. Given this finding, the ARDL bounds testing approach can be applied to test 
the cointegration hypothesis among the focal variables. According to the ARDL bounds 
testing approach, lag order of the variables is important for the model specification. Hence, 
we determine the lag optimization based on lag-order selection using various information 
criteria including Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SC) 
and Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQ). Since AIC has superior power properties for sample data 
compared to any lag length criterion, we show that the optimum lag is 3 (Table-3). 
 
Table-2:  Results of ADF and PP Unit Tests 
Variables ADF test PP test 
 Level First difference Level First difference 
LBPI --- -15.8916*** --- -32.5107*** 
LTTR -5.8908** --- -15.5010*** --- 
LETR -2.9074** --- -31.0877*** --- 
LMBV -5.5649*** --- -25.8706*** --- 
LEOV -3.7443** --- --- -72.5447*** 
LHASH --- -29.0159*** --- -13.7236*** 
LGP --- -26.9126*** --- -23.3523*** 
LSI --- -28.5842*** --- -18.5978*** 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively ; The numbers within parentheses for the 
ADF  and PP statistics represents the lag length of the dependent variable used to obtain white noise residuals ; The lag 
lengths for the ADF and PP tests were selected using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
 
Table-3: Lag-order selection 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0  795.3703 NA   0.006820 -2.149987 -2.048775 -2.110926 
1  799.7037  8.463462  0.006758 -2.159183  -2.051645* -2.117680 
2  802.3041   5.071735*  0.006728 -2.163598 -2.049734  -2.119654* 
3  803.4872  2.304132   0.006725*  -2.164103* -2.043913 -2.117718 
4  803.6028  0.224915  0.006741 -2.161663 -2.035148 -2.112837 
5  803.6350  0.062545  0.006759 -2.158993 -2.026152 -2.107726 
6  803.9671  0.643943  0.006772 -2.157151 -2.017984 -2.103442 
7  804.0653  0.190309  0.006789 -2.154663 -2.009171 -2.098513 
8  804.9309  1.673839  0.006791 -2.154292 -2.002474 -2.095701 
Notes: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion; LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level); FPE: 
Final prediction error; AIC: Akaike information criterion; SC: Schwarz information criterion; HQ: Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion. 
 
Using ARDL Bounds testing approach, we show interesting results (Table-4): The 
investors’ attractiveness plays a significant role in explaining Bitcoin price formation. Indeed, 
an increase by 10% in TTR expands the BTP by about 2.01%. The exchange-trade ratio affects 
positively and significantly the price of Bitcoin. An increase by 10% of ETR leads to an 
increase by 0.32% of BPI. Bitcoin velocity and estimated output volume have no significant 
impact on Bitcoin price formation. The influence of technical driver (HASH) seems positive 
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and significant but minor. We notice that an increase by 10% of HASH prompts an increase 
by 0.03% in the prices of Bitcoin. Gold price has no influence on Bitcoin price, while Shangai 
market index contributes positively and significantly to BPI (i.e. an increase by 10% of SI 
leads to an increase by 1.18% in Bitcoin price).  
 
Table-4: The ARDL Bounds Testing Analysis 
Dependent variable: DLBPIt 
C 0.6078 
(1.0537) 
DLBPIt-1 0.11687** 
(2.96916) 
DLBPIt-2 0.11154** 
(2.95493) 
DLBPIt-3 -0.0618 
(-1.6440) 
DLTTRt-1 0.20127*** 
(9.12259) 
DLETRt-1 0.0329* 
(1.6778) 
DLMBVt-1 0.00134 
(0.2775) 
DLEOVt-1 0.0030 
(0.37838) 
DLHASHt-1 0.01192 
(0.4814) 
DLGPt-1 0.17445 
(0.6631) 
DLSIt-1 0.1182* 
(1.9049) 
LBPIt-1 -0.01014 
(-1.0310) 
LTTRt-1 0.0038 
(0.4752) 
LETRt-1 0.0096* 
(1.8057) 
LMBVt-1 0.0038 
(0.6587) 
LEOVt-1 0.0034 
(0.5983) 
LHASHt-1 0.0035* 
(1.7380) 
LGPt-1 -0.1189 
(-1.3637) 
LSIt-1 0.02128 
(0.4324) 
Diagnostic tests 
R-squared 
SE regression 
Breush-Godfrey serial correlation  
 
Ramsey Reset test 
0.4586 
0.8859 
0.0955  
[0.9089] 
0.03503 
 [0.8516] 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; [.]: p-value. 
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In addition, we depict from Table-5 that the value of F-statistic exceeds the upper 
bound at the 10% significance level, implying that there is evidence of a long-run relationship 
among variables at this level of significance. These results seem insufficient to capture 
accurately the evidence of long-term linkage because ARDL bounds test is unable to detect 
structural breaks stemming in the time series under consideration. Given its inability to 
account for nonlinearity, we believe that it is substantial to apply the method of Gregory and 
Hansen (1996) to re-explore this nexus. This technique is based on an unknown structural 
break in the focal variables with respect to Engle-Granger residual. This test reinforces the 
fact that there is a long-run cointegration between Bitcoin price and its drivers and highlights 
the great importance to consider structural breaks in the interaction dynamic process of BPI as 
well as its main determinants (Table-6).  
 
 
Table -5: The ARDL Bounds Testing Analysis 
Estimated model Optimal lag length F-statistic Prob. 
FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, 
LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LSI) 
3, 3,4, 1, 0, 0  4.702941* 0.0106 
Significance level Critical values: T=21 
Lower bounds I(0) Upper bounds I(1) 
1% 
5% 
10% 
6.84 
4.94 
4.04 
7.84 
5.73 
4.78 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; Critical values were obtained from 
Pesaran et al. (2001).  
 
 
Table-6:  Gregory-Hansen Structural Break Cointegration Test 
Estimated model FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LSI) 
Structural break year 27/10/2013 
ADF-test -4.9861** 
Prob.values 0.0029 
Significance level Critical values of the ADF test 
1% 
5% 
10% 
-5.8652 
-4.9271 
-4.8135 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
The diagnostic tests show that there is no evidence of serial correlation. The Ramsey 
reset test statistic reveals the performance of the short-run model (Table-4). The CUSUM and 
the CUSUM Squares test show the adequacy of the considered models at 5% level of 
significance (Figure-2) and the stability of ARDL parameters (Figure-3). 
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Figure-2: Plots of cumulative sum of recursive and of squares of recursive residuals 
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
I II III IV I II III IV
2011 2012
CUSUM 5% Significance  
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
IV I II III IV I II III IV
2011 2012
CUSUM of Squares 5% Significance  
Notes: The straight lines represent the critical bounds at 5% significance level. 
 
Figure-3: Plots of cumulative sum of recursive coefficients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The straight lines represent the critical bounds at 5% significance level. 
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From our results reported in Table-7, it is well shown that Bitcoin price interacts 
differently with its determinants depending to time periods. In the short-run, the users’ 
interest, the exchange-trade ratio, the estimated output volume and the Shangai index affect 
positively and significantly the BPI. However, the monetary velocity, the hash rate and the 
gold price have no influence on this digital money. These outcomes change intensely in the 
long-run. The speculation, the EOV and the Chinese stock market index which play the major 
role in the short term, have any effect on BPI in the long-run. The impact of ETR on BPI stills 
positive and significant, but becomes much less important. The impacts of MBV and GP on 
BPI remain insignificant, while the hash rate appears as significant player. Furthermore, the 
value of ECT is negative and statistically significant at 5 percent level, which is theoretically 
correct. It amounts (-7.97E-06), implying that the deviation in the short-run is corrected by 
0.0007% towards the long-run equilibrium path. The R-squared value indicates that 44% of 
Bitcoin price dynamic is explained by the explanatory variables. 
 
4.2.Innovative accounting approach results 
The results of the variance decomposition are reported in Table-8. We find that 
69.17% percent of Bitcoin price is explained by its own innovative shocks. The investors’ 
attractiveness (TTR) plays the major role in explaining the price of the focal money (20.34%). 
The contribution of ETR appears minor (0.16%). Similarly for monetary velocity, the 
estimated output volume and the hash rate do not have great effect on the dynamic of this new 
currency, with respective percentages equal to 0.035%, 0.037% and 0.003%. Gold price 
explains 0.095% of BPI but we should not forget to mention that the link between GP and 
BPI appears insignificant in the above results. Additionally, the contribution of Chinese 
market index (SI) seems sharply considerable (10.14%). 
To be more effective in our analysis, we add the results of the impulse response 
function. It traces the time path of the impacts of shocks of independent variable on the 
dependent variables in a VAR system. The impulse response function allows us to show how 
long independent variable reacts to shock stemming in the dependent variables. We can see 
also the magnitude of the response of Bitcoin price to its own shock, those of investors’ 
attractiveness, exchange-trade volume, monetary velocity, estimated output volume, hash rate, 
gold price and Shangai market indices. Figure-4 worthy indicates that the responses in Bitcoin 
price owing to forecast error stemming in investors’ attractiveness as well as the Chinese 
market index  seem positive over time. The contributions of ETR, MBV, EOV, HASH and GP 
to Bitcoin price appear negligible.  
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Table-7: Short-run and long-run Analysis 
Dependent variable: LBPIt 
Short-run 
DLBPIt 0.1252*** 
(3.1873) 
DLTTRt 0.5269** 
(2.8944) 
DLETRt 0.1287*** 
(7.0988) 
DLMBVt 2.7411 
(0.2189) 
DLEOVt 0.0798*** 
(3.6287) 
DLHASHt 0.0594 
(0.5379) 
DLGPt -0.2415 
(-0.9103) 
DLSIt 0.3802* 
(1.6444) 
ECTt -7.97E-06** 
(-2.5130) 
Long-run 
LBPIt 0.1328*** 
(3.3635) 
LTTRt 0.1434 
(0.5414) 
LETRt 0.0180* 
(1.7073) 
LMBVt 0.0043 
(0.8892) 
LEOVt 0.0073 
(0.8993) 
LHASHt 0.0072* 
(1.8478) 
LGPt -0.0015 
(-0.1556) 
LSIt 0.2157 
(0.1062) 
Diagnostic tests 
R-squared 
SE regression 
Breush-Godfrey serial correlation  
 
Ramsey Reset test  
0.44 
0.7812 
0.3987 
 [0.1125] 
0.2419  
[0.6038] 
Notes : ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively Diagnostic tests results are based on F-
statistic ; [.] : p-values. 
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Table-8: Variance Decomposition of Bitcoin price 
Period S.E. LBPI LTTR LETR LMBV LEOV LHASH LGP LSI 
1  0.089209  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
2  0.133356  69.62125  20.02477  0.099387  0.021195  0.048033  0.000927  0.002721  10.18171 
3  0.173881  69.36913  20.14811  0.154151  0.041684  0.040414  0.008345  0.074429  10.16373 
4  0.207915  69.31502  20.21095  0.143917  0.034885  0.040420  0.005948  0.079367  10.16948 
5  0.237979  69.26216  20.26038  0.154534  0.037175  0.038559  0.004840  0.083554  10.15879 
6  0.264822  69.22643  20.29075  0.160299  0.037687  0.038561  0.004506  0.087948  10.15380 
7  0.289336  69.20724  20.31188  0.161535  0.037241  0.038131  0.003989  0.091187  10.14878 
8  0.311935  69.19196  20.32765  0.163871  0.036489  0.037956  0.003689  0.093026  10.14535 
9  0.333019  69.18027 20.33966  0.165645  0.035905  0.037888  0.003476  0.094519  10.14264 
10  0.352847  69.17171 20.34903  0.166578  0.035233  0.037921  0.003293  0.095698  10.14054 
 
Figure-4: Impulse Response Function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2 4 6 8 10
Response of BPI to BPI
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2 4 6 8 10
Response of BPI to TTR
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2 4 6 8 10
Response of BPI to ETR
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2 4 6 8 10
Response of BPI to MB V
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2 4 6 8 10
Response of BPI to EOV
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2 4 6 8 10
Response of BP I to HASH
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2 4 6 8 10
Response of BPI to GP
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2 4 6 8 10
Response of BPI to SI
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of TTR to BPI
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of TTR to TTR
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of TTR to ETR
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of TTR to MBV
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of TTR to EOV
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of TTR to HA SH
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of TTR to GP
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of TTR to SI
-2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10
Response of ETR to BPI
-2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10
Response of ETR to TTR
-2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10
Response of ETR to ETR
-2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10
Response of  ETR to MBV
-2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10
Response of ETR to EOV
-2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10
Response of ETR to HA SH
-2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10
Response of ETR to GP
-2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10
Response of ETR to SI
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of MBV to BPI
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of MBV to TTR
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of  MBV to ETR
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of MBV to MBV
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of MBV to EOV
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of  MBV to HA SH
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of MBV to GP
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of MB V to SI
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of EOV to BPI
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of EOV to TTR
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of  EOV to ETR
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of EOV to MBV
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of EOV to EOV
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of  EOV to HA SH
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of EOV to GP
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of EOV to SI
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of HASH to BPI
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of HASH to TTR
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of HASH to ETR
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of HA SH to MBV
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of HAS H to EOV
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of HASH to HASH
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of HAS H to GP
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of HA SH to SI
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of GP to BPI
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of GP  to TTR
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of GP to ETR
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of GP to MB V
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of GP to EOV
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of GP  to HASH
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of GP to GP
-4
-2
0
2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of GP to SI
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of SI to BPI
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of SI to TTR
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of SI to ETR
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of SI to MBV
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of SI  to EOV
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of SI to HASH
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of SI to GP
0.0
0.5
1.0
2 4 6 8 10
Response of SI to SI
Response to Nonfactorized One Unit Innovations
16 
 
Furthermore, we evaluate whether there is a causal relationship between the 
explanatory variables in question and the Bitcoin price dynamic. Before testing the non-
causality hypothesis, we start by examining the residuals using the LM test for serial 
independence against the alternative of AR(k)/MA(k), for k = 1, ...., 12. From the findings 
reported in Table-9, the serial correlation may be removed at the maximum lag length which 
is 3. The non-causality test findings are reported in Table-10. It is notable that we can reject 
the null hypothesis of no causality DLTTR to DLBPI, from DLETR to DLBPI and from DLSI 
to DLBPI, while the reverse link is not supported. This confirms the above outcomes obtained 
through the ARDL Bounds Testing method and the innovation accounting approach. For the 
rest of variables, we accept the null hypothesis of non-causality (except for the relationship 
that runs from DLBPI to DLHASH and the link running from DLBPI to DLMBV). These 
results may be very useful for businesses, investors and regulators. 
Table-9: VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1  165.7815  0.0000 
2  162.7223  0.0000 
3  172.6073  0.0000 
4  74.87208  0.1661 
5  108.8017  0.0004 
6  52.65505  0.8435 
7  86.67175  0.0312 
8  59.58174  0.6333 
9  73.80962  0.1882 
10  67.46570  0.3595 
11  69.17378  0.3071 
12  88.51908  0.0229 
 
Table-10: VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Dependent variable: DLBPI 
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob 
DLTTR≠DLBPI 
DLBPI≠DLTTR 
4.4897 
0.7034 
2 
2 
 0.0474 
0.7035 
DLETR≠DLBPI 
DLBPI≠DLETR  
2.9722 
4.2470 
2 
2 
 0.0226 
0.1196 
DLMBV≠DLBPI 
DLBPI≠DLMBV 
0.9299 
13.698 
2 
2 
 0.6281 
0.0011 
DLEOV≠DLBPI 
DLBPI≠DLEOV 
1.1004 
1.9394 
2 
2 
 0.5768 
0.3792 
DLHASH≠DLBPI 
DLBPI≠DLHASH 
0.3544 
6.2336 
2 
2 
 0.8376 
0.0443 
DLGP≠DLBPI 
DLBPI≠DLGP 
1.0579 
1.0588 
2 
2 
0.3574 
0.3572 
DLSI≠DLBPI 
DLBPI≠DLSI 
3.5051 
1.4394 
2 
2 
 0.0733 
0.4869 
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5. Robustness 
The above findings clearly indicate that the investors’ attractiveness, the exchange-
trade ratio, the estimated output volume and the Shangai index affect positively and 
significantly the Bitcoin price, while the monetary velocity, the hash rate and the gold price 
have no influence in the short term. However, the speculative nature of BPI, the EOV and the 
Chinese stock market index which play the major role in the short-run appear without 
statistically significant impact on Bitcoin price in the long-run. The influence of ETR on BPI 
becomes less strong, while the effects of MBV and GP on BPI remain insignificant in the 
majority of cases. The hash rate plays a significant role on explaining the dynamic of this 
nascent virtual currency. To check properly and appropriately the robustness of these 
evidences, we re-estimate the relationships between Bitcoin price and its determinants by 
incorporating a dummy variable relative to the bankruptcy of Chinese trading company, using 
the same methods (i.e. an ARDL Bounds Testing method, an innovation accounting approach 
by simulating variance decomposition and impulse response function and VEC Granger 
causality test). Accurate details are reported in Table A-1, Table A-2, Table A-3, Table A-4, 
Table A-5, Table A-6, Figure A-1, Figure A-2 and Figure A-3. Comparing these results with 
those of Equation without dummy variable, we put in evidence that the effects of TTR, ETR, 
MBV, EOV, HASH, GP and SI are solid and unambiguous, especially in terms of time-
horizons (i.e. short- and long-run assessments). Beyond the nuances of short and long terms, 
the present study confirms the speculative nature of Bitcoin without neglecting its usefulness 
in economic reasons and the importance of accounting for Chinese stock market and the 
processing power of Bitcoin network. At this stage, we can consider it only as a speculative 
bubble, a risky investment, short-term hedge and partially as business income. Nonetheless, 
this new crypto-currency seems far from being a safe haven and a long-term promise.  
To be more effective, we believe that the use of other combinations by adding other 
variables in Equations 3 and 4 may be fruitful (For example, we add oil price4, Dow Jones 
index5 and a dummy variable denoting the closing of road silk by FBI6) . Nevertheless, the 
obtained findings reveal that the effects of the additional time series are in the majority of 
cases insignificant and more importantly the estimates become remarkably unstable (see 
Figure A-4, particularly). More details about outcomes are reported in Table A-7, Table A-8, 
Table A-9, Table A-9, Table A-11, Table A-12, Figure A-5 and Figure A-6. 
                                                             
4 Palombizio and Morris (2012) find that oil price (OP) is a potential factor that may affect intensely the inflation outcomes. 
If the price of oil indicates great ups and downs (i.e. sizeable volatility), the Bitcoin depreciates.  
5 The relationship between Bitcoin price and the Dow Jones index (DJI) appears complex, since the two variables seem 
sometimes correlated but not usually. For instance, after the announcement of American satellite TV provider that it would 
start accepting Bitcoin as payment tool, the prices of this digital money increased approximately by $40 touching the level of 
$ 600, while the Dow Jones Index was down by 300 points. This seems a perfect example of how the Bitcoin and the 
American markets have been initially unrelated. Nevertheless, the offshoots of Al-Qaeda over different cities in Iraq and the 
Obama’s declaration (i.e. America will not send the military in order to fight off the terrorist organizations) have affected 
Bitcoin price and simultaneously Dow Jones index. Due to the great connection between the turmoil and Bitcoin’s value, the 
price of Bitcoin started dropping and as response the Dow Jones index started falling by 200 points. This implies that there is 
some relation between both variables. For details, you can refer to: http://coinbrief.net/bitcoin-price-news-analysis/ 
 
6 The Road Silk is a roating-platform of drug on which transactions were through Bitcoin. Thus, its closing by FBI in 
23/10/2013 (DV’) has affected substantially the dynamic of Bitcoin price. 
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6.  Conclusions and some Policy implications 
The present research attempts to reach clearer knowledge about a nascent crypto-
currency (Bitcoin) by effectively answering the following questions: What Bitcoin looks like? 
Is it a safe haven or a “speculative bubble”? Is it a business income or a risky investment? Is it 
a short-term hedge or a long-term promise?  
To this end, we have regressed Bitcoin price on investors’ attractiveness, exchange-
trade volume, monetary velocity, estimated output volume, hash rate, gold price and Shangai 
market index using an ARDL Bounds Testing method, an innovation accounting approach 
and VEC Granger causality test for daily data covering the period from December 2010 to 
June 2014. By doing so, we clearly show the unpleasantly speculative behavior of Bitcoin. 
We also provide insightful evidence that BPI may be used for economic reasons. However, 
there is any sign of being a safe haven. By accounting for the Chinese trading bankruptcy, the 
contribution of  speculation and the performance of Chinese stock market remain dominant, 
while the role of Bitcoin as transactions tool dissipates in the long-run, highlighting the 
robustness of our results. Intuitively, by using other combinations of variables by adding  
supplementary time series (oil price, Dow Jones index and a dummy variable denoting the 
closing of road silk by FBI), the estimates become remarkably unstable. It is important to 
mention here that these last variables have no statistically significant influence in the majority 
of cases in Bitcoin price dynamic. 
In a nutshell, Bitcoin behaves heavily as a “speculative bubble”, short-term hedge and 
risky investment and partially as business income. There is any evidence to be a safe haven. 
This new digital money is far from being a long-term promise, especially when considering 
that this virtual currency faces a great challenge (in particular a structural economic problem) 
regarding its limited amount recording 21 million units in 2140, implying that the money 
supply would not expand after this date. If this digital currency succeeds really to displace fiat 
currencies, it would exert great deflationary pressures.  
This goes without saying that these findings should be treated with caution. Nobody is, 
up to now, able to estimate the true value of Bitcoin. The fact that its dynamic is uncertain 
even more sustains great speculation. Without tackling the main causes, the virtual currency 
seems highly correlated to the speculative behaviors of investors and people who hold this 
money. This digital money is not issued by banking system and even less by governments, but 
by a computing algorithm. Unfortunately, the majority of users have not heavily 
acknowledged about mathematical programs, and it is of course unknown for them how far it 
can go.  
Importantly, the volatility of Bitcoin and the difficulty of processing power network 
are likely to discourage investors and users of this money. Additionally, the sizeable attention 
to this crypto-currency in the Chinese media has drawn a huge number of investors in China’s 
market. However, the attitude of practitioners, advisers and regulators towards Bitcoin in this 
country is ambiguous, reinforcing the possible detrimental effects of speculation. This may 
sustain the evidence thereby this nascent virtual currency is short-term hedge and a risky 
investment. We cannot confirm at this stage if Bitcoin may be considered as long-term 
promise since the contribution of investors’ interest appears dominant among the different 
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estimations. This may support the conclusion of Bouoiyour et al. (2014 b) showing that it is 
very difficult to reach clearer insights and solid and conclusive outcomes into phenomenon. 
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Appendices 
Table A.1: Lag-order selection 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LSI, DV) 
0  781.6729 NA   0.007309 -2.080742  -1.974351*  -2.039709* 
1  782.5517  1.714736  0.007312 -2.080413 -1.967763 -2.036966 
2  782.9059  0.690066  0.007325 -2.078656 -1.959747 -2.032795 
3  785.3696   4.793244*   0.007295*  -2.082638* -1.957472 -2.034364 
4  785.3825  0.025151  0.007315 -2.079952 -1.948528 -2.029264 
5  785.4114  0.056055  0.007334 -2.077310 -1.939627 -2.024208 
6  785.4309  0.037764  0.007354 -2.074642 -1.930700 -2.019126 
7  785.4515  0.039790  0.007374 -2.071977 -1.921777 -2.014047 
8  785.6675  0.417417  0.007390 -2.069844 -1.913385 -2.009500 
Notes: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion; LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level); FPE: 
Final prediction error; AIC: Akaike information criterion; SC: Schwarz information criterion; HQ: Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion. 
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Table A-2: The ARDL Bounds Testing Analysis 
Dependent variable: DLBPIt 
C 3.4815 
(1.1373) 
DLBPIt-1 
 
0.5641** 
(3.0184) 
DLBPIt-2 
 
0.1557*** 
(3.8357) 
DLTTRt-1 0.4846* 
(1.8352) 
DLETRt-1 0.0825* 
(1.6934) 
DLMBVt-1 0.0049 
(0.2057) 
DLEOVt-1 0.0428 
(1.9022) 
DLHASHt-1 0.0075 
(0.4132) 
DLGPt-1 0.3248 
(0.1847) 
DLSIt-1 0.3516* 
(2.2567) 
LBPIt-1 0.1602*** 
(3.2488) 
LTTRt-1 0.0336 
(1.1308) 
LETRt-1 0.0314 
(0.8947) 
LMBVt-1 0.0344 
(1.2216) 
LEOVt-1 0.0137 
(0.4755) 
LHASHt-1 0.0092* 
(1.8607) 
LGPt-1 -0.0555 
(-1.1431) 
LSIt-1 -1.0622 
(-0.8250) 
DV -0.0957 
(-1.8796) 
R-squared 
SE regression 
Breush-Godfrey serial correlation  
 
Ramsey Reset test 
0.48 
0.7241 
0.0133 
 [0.6214] 
0.0217  
[0.6528] 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; [.]: p-value. 
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Table A-3: The ARDL Bounds Testing Analysis 
Estimated model Optimal lag length F-statistic Prob. 
FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, 
LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LSI, DV) 
3, 3,4, 1, 0, 0 4.2852* 0.0381 
Significance level Critical values 
Lower bounds I(0) Upper bounds I(1) 
1% 
5% 
10% 
6.84 
4.94 
4.04 
7.84 
5.73 
4.78 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; Critical values were obtained from 
Pesaran et al. (2001).  
 
Table A-4:  Gregory-Hansen Structural Break Cointegration Test 
Estimated model FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LSI, DV) 
Structural break year 18/12/2013 
ADF-test -4.8743*** 
Prob.values 0.0000 
Significance level Critical values of the ADF test 
1% 
5% 
10% 
-5.8652 
-4.9271 
-4.8135 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Figure A-1: Plots of cumulative sum of recursive and of squares of recursive residuals 
FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LSI, DV) 
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Notes: The straight lines represent the critical bounds at 5% significance level. 
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Figure A-2: Plots of cumulative sum of recursive coefficients 
FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LGP, LSI, DV) 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The straight lines represent the critical bounds at 5% significance level. 
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Table A-5: Short-run and long-run Analysis 
Dependent variable: LBPIt 
Short-run 
DLBPIt 0.3722*** 
(7.6306) 
DLTTRt 0.3107** 
(3.2019) 
DLETRt 0.0954*** 
(5.4125) 
DLMBVt -5.1072 
(-1.3082) 
DLEOVt 0.1583*** 
(3.7943) 
DLHASHt 0.3040 
(0.1569) 
DLGPt -0.0238 
(-0.9867) 
DLSIt 0.2272** 
(2.9769) 
ECTt -3.20E-06* 
(-1.7186) 
Long-run 
LBPIt 0.2309*** 
(4.7347) 
LTTRt 0.0279 
(1.2933) 
LETRt 0.0222* 
(1.9182) 
LMBVt 0.0287 
(0.9623) 
LEOVt -0.0030 
(-0.0778) 
LHASHt 0.0076* 
(1.9784) 
LGPt 0.2140 
(0.8852) 
LSIt 0.3295 
(0.2478) 
DV -0.0812* 
(-1.7697) 
R-squared 
SE regression 
Breush-Godfrey serial correlation  
 
Ramsey Reset test  
0.36 
0.5376 
0.0862 
[0.5034] 
0.0129 
[0.3185] 
Notes : ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively Diagnostic tests results are based on       
F-statistic ; [.] : p-values. 
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Table A-6: Variance Decomposition of Bitcoin price 
Period S.E. BPI TTR ETR MBV EOV HASH GP SI 
1  0.437211  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
2  0.531016  69.16401  20.07857  0.046293  0.192572  0.172621  0.216206  7.05E-05  10.12964 
3  0.587408  68.89641  20.06423  0.074224  0.207786  0.157107  0.180322  0.175893  10.24402 
4  0.653719  68.88240  20.05204  0.094030  0.169006  0.140286  0.155463  0.211353  10.29542 
5  0.713412  68.85767 20.04848  0.091867  0.142428  0.156410  0.158901  0.212927  10.33130 
6  0.765985  68.85128  20.04238  0.094067  0.123555  0.162226  0.144646  0.224575  10.35726 
7  0.815668  68.84969  20.03788  0.097420  0.109980  0.162901  0.135923  0.233969  10.37223 
8  0.862787  68.84846  20.03494  0.099140  0.098834  0.165991  0.130940  0.239833  10.38186 
9  0.907295  68.84839  20.03210  0.100438  0.090140  0.169011  0.125686  0.244983  10.38925 
10  0.949679  68.84880  20.02980  0.101707  0.083155  0.170850  0.121426  0.249415  10.39483 
 
Figure A-3: Impulse Response Function 
FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LSI, DV) 
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Table-A.7: Lag-order selection (Equations with additional variables) 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
(1) : FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LOP, LDJI, LSI) 
0  3678.627 NA*   2.36e-06*  -10.11759*  -10.04801*  -10.09074* 
1  3678.644  0.032814  2.37e-06 -10.11488 -10.03897 -10.08558 
2  3678.673  0.057395  2.38e-06 -10.11220 -10.02997 -10.08046 
3  3678.675  0.003638  2.38e-06 -10.10945 -10.02089 -10.07527 
(2) : FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LOP, LDJI, LSI, DV) 
0  782.4109 NA   0.006972 -2.128030 -2.058447 -2.101176 
1  788.0603  11.11191  0.006883 -2.140856  -2.064947* -2.111560* 
2  791.0228   5.818642  0.006846 -2.146270* -2.064035  -2.114533 
3  792.0847  2.082820   0.006844*  -2.146441 -2.05738 -2.112262 
(3) : FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LOP, LDJI, LSI, DV’) 
0  163.4746 NA   0.004414 -2.585117 -2.544254 -2.569759 
1  164.5226  20.77749  0.004348 -2.600201*  -2.555252* -2.583308 
2  164.5759  1.055509  0.004351 -2.599458 -2.550422 -2.581029* 
3  164.6161  0.795628  0.004355* -2.598506 -2.545384 -2.578541 
Notes: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion; LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level); FPE: 
Final prediction error; AIC: Akaike information criterion; SC: Schwarz information criterion; HQ: Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion. DV’: The closing of the Road Silk by FBI, which amounts 1 from 23/10/2013 and 0 otherwise. 
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Table A-8: The ARDL Bounds Testing Analysis (Equations with additional variables) 
Dependent variable: ΔLBPIt 
 (1) (2)             (3) 
C -2.4325* 
(-1.7278) 
-1.7262* 
(-2.5645) 
-1.4941* 
(-2.1939) 
ΔLBPIt-1 
 
0.1185** 
(3.0231) 
0.0376* 
(2.0056) 
0.0288* 
(1.6232) 
ΔLBPIt-2 
 
--- 0.0394* 
(2.2019) 
--- 
ΔLTTRt-1 0.1222** 
(3.1537) 
0.2062* 
(1.7683) 
0.0068* 
(1.7044) 
ΔLETRt-1 0.1153** 
(3.0589) 
0.0093* 
(1.8553) 
0.0087* 
(1.7147) 
ΔLMBVt-1 -0.1222 
(-0.2482) 
0.0010 
(0.4548) 
0.0011 
(0.6971) 
ΔLEOVt-1 0.0030 
(0.3763) 
0.0016 
(0.4187) 
0.0021 
(0.5425) 
ΔLHASHt-1 -0.0141 
(-0.5719) 
-0.0079 
(-0.6775) 
-0.0060 
(-0.5051) 
ΔLGPt-1 0.1559 
(0.5900) 
-0.0614 
(-0.4894) 
-0.1064 
(-0.8379) 
ΔLOPt-1 -0.1043 
(-0.5383) 
0.1004 
(1.0901) 
0.0086 
(0.9297) 
ΔLDJIt-1 -0.1268 
(-0.3857) 
-0.1267 
(-0.8120) 
-0.0971 
(-0.6185) 
ΔLSIt-1 0.1468* 
(2.000) 
0.1235* 
(1.9516) 
0.1104* 
(1.8452) 
LBPIt-1 0.0186* 
(1.6551) 
0.0141** 
(2.6353) 
-0.0079 
(-1.3922) 
LTTRt-1 -0.0162 
(-1.5979) 
0.0043 
(1.0714) 
-0.0064 
(-1.3244) 
LETRt-1 0.0158* 
(2.2800) 
0.0039* 
(1.9519) 
0.0059* 
(1.8516) 
LMBVt-1 0.0032 
(0.5693) 
-0.0027 
(-0.9879) 
-0.0037 
(-1.3088) 
LEOVt-1 0.0026 
(0.4453) 
0.0051* 
(1.7506) 
0.0039 
(1.3735) 
LHASHt-1 0.0056* 
(1.8862) 
-0.0010 
(-0.5489) 
0.0081** 
(2.6473) 
LGPt-1 -0.0534 
(-0.9023) 
-0.0011 
(-0.0405) 
-0.0143 
(-0.4907) 
LOPt-1 -0.0161 
(-0.2627) 
-0.0653 
(-0.2364) 
-0.0310 
(-0.9948) 
LDJIt-1 0.0355* 
(2.2728) 
0.1008*** 
(3.8895) 
0.1002*** 
(4.0147) 
LSIt-1 0.0762 
(1.3060) 
0.0104 
(0.3766) 
-0.0186 
(-0.5807) 
DV --- -0.0163* 
(-1.7604) 
--- 
DV’ --- --- -0.0278* 
(-2.4188) 
R-squared 
SE regression 
Breush-Godfrey serial correlation  
Ramsey Reset test 
0.54 
0.8881 
0.6231 [0.4097] 
   0.2664 [0.6058] 
0.44 
0.7923 
0.0069 [0.9338] 
0.0316 [0.9689] 
0.42 
0.7795 
0.0081 [0.4276] 
0.0049 [0.6618] 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; [.]: p-value; DV’:  The closing of the 
Road Silk by FBI, which amounts 1 from 23/10/2013 and 0 otherwise. 
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Table A-9: The ARDL Bounds Testing Analysis (Equations with additional variables) 
Estimated model Optimal lag length F-statistic Prob. 
(1): FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, 
LHASH, LGP, LOP, LDJI, LSI) 
3, 3,4, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0 4.5711* 0.0659 
(2): FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, 
LHASH, LGP, LOP, LDJI, LSI, DV) 
3, 3,4, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0 4.4426* 0.0550 
(3): FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, 
LHASH, LGP, LOP, LDJI, LSI, DV’) 
3, 3,4, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0 4.4019* 0.0537 
Significance level Critical values 
Lower bounds I(0) Upper bounds I(1) 
1% 
5% 
10% 
6.84 
4.94 
4.04 
7.84 
5.73 
4.78 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; Critical values were obtained from 
Pesaran et al. (2001); DV’:  The closing of the Road Silk by FBI, which amounts 1 from 23/10/2013 and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Table A-10:  Gregory-Hansen Structural Break Cointegration Test                               
(Equations with additional variables) 
Estimated model (1): FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, 
LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, 
LOP, LDJI, LSI) 
(2): FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, 
LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, 
LOP, LDJI, LSI, DV) 
(3): FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, 
LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LOP, LDJI, 
LSI, DV) 
Structural break 
year 
23/10/2013 26/2/2013 23/10/2013 
ADF-test -5.9234*** -4.9782** -5.2139*** 
Prob.values 0.0015 0.0015 0.0004 
Significance level Critical values of the ADF test 
1% 
5% 
10% 
-5.8652 
-4.9271 
-4.8135 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; DV’:  The closing of the Road Silk by 
FBI, which amounts 1 from 23/10/2013 and 0 otherwise. 
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Figure A-4: Plots of cumulative sum of recursive and of squares of recursive residuals 
(Equations with additional variables) 
(1): FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LOP, LDJI, LSI) 
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Notes: The straight lines represent the critical bounds at 5% significance level; DV’:  The closing of the Road Silk by FBI, 
which amounts 1 from 23/10/2013 and 0 otherwise. 
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Figure A-5: Plots of cumulative sum of recursive coefficients (Equations with additional 
variables) 
(1): FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LOP, LDJI, LSI) 
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(2): FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LOP, LDJI, LSI, DV) 
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(3): FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LOP, LDJI, LSI, DV’) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The straight lines represent the critical bounds at 5% significance level; DV’: The closing of the Road Silk by FBI, 
which amounts 1 from 23/10/2013 and 0 otherwise. 
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Table A-11: Short-run and long-run Analysis (Equations with additional variables) 
Dependent variable: LBPIt 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Short-run 
ΔLBPIt 0.1270*** 
(3.2270) 
0.0281* 
(2.1537) 
0.0269** 
(2.5852) 
ΔLTTRt 0.4305* 
(2.0214) 
0.5702* 
(2.1522) 
0.4787*** 
(4.1026) 
ΔLETRt 0.2157*** 
(8.4441) 
0.0192*** 
(7.3397) 
0.0172** 
(2.6367) 
ΔLMBVt -2.2467 
(-0.1721) 
0.7897 
(0.2109) 
0.4398* 
(1.7485) 
ΔLEOVt 0.4158* 
(2.5803) 
-0.4434 
(-0.2068) 
0.0172 
(0.3859) 
ΔLHASHt -0.0283 
(-0.3214) 
-0.0915 
(-0.7780) 
-0.0057 
(-0.3802) 
ΔLGPt -3.4273 
(-1.5320) 
-0.0054 
(-0.3213) 
-0.0928 
(-0.6674) 
ΔLOPt -2.4806 
(-1.5448) 
-0.7780 
(-1.4343) 
0.7488 
(1.4354) 
ΔLDJIt 2.0697 
(0.5522) 
0.8341 
(0.6264) 
-0.0259 
(-1.3648) 
ΔLSIt 0.3256* 
(1.6625) 
0.4786** 
(2.6372) 
0.4784*** 
(4.6666) 
ECTt -0.0023** 
(-2.8790) 
-0.0020* 
(-1.6791) 
-0.0026** 
(-2.5190) 
Long-run 
LBPIt 0.1340*** 
(3.3768) 
0.1265*** 
(3.2112) 
0.1275** 
(3.2394) 
LTTRt -0.0131 
(-1.3168) 
0.0016 
(0.1611) 
-0.0529 
(-0.2708) 
LETRt 0.0088* 
(1.8163) 
0.0010* 
(1.7842) 
0.0029* 
(1.8604) 
LMBVt 0.0001*** 
(8.8192) 
0.0921 
(0.9284) 
-0.0012 
(-0.2067) 
LEOVt 0.0043 
(0.5435) 
0.0655 
(1.0307) 
-0.0070 
(-0.8598) 
LHASHt 0.0077* 
(1.9745) 
0.0029* 
(1.8148) 
0.0053* 
(1.8371) 
LGPt 0.1518 
(0.5697) 
0.1534 
(0.5752) 
-0.1684 
(-0.6232) 
LOPt -0.0518 
(-0.2658) 
-0.0515 
(-0.2642) 
0.0019 
(0.1915) 
LDJIt 0.1420*** 
(4.2680) 
0.1852* 
(2.4937) 
0.2417*** 
(3.8358) 
LSIt 0.4400 
(1.5950) 
0.4406 
(1.5948) 
0.4457 
(1.5960) 
DV --- -0.0569* 
(-1.8245) 
--- 
DV’ --- --- -0.0782** 
(-2.2516) 
R-squared 
SE regression 
Breush-Godfrey serial correlation  
Ramsey Reset test  
0.48 
0.8561 
0.4597 [0.1386] 
0.2392 [0.5674] 
0.49 
0.8934 
0.0437 [0.6795] 
0.0087 [0.9015] 
0.46 
0.8357 
0.0398 [0.5012] 
0.0127 [0.8564] 
Notes : ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively Diagnostic tests results are based on F-
statistic ; [.] : p-values; DV’: The closing of the Road Silk by FBI, which amounts 1 from 23/10/2013 and 0 otherwise. 
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Table A-12: Variance Decomposition of Bitcoin price (Equations with additional variables) 
Period S.E. BPI TTR ETR MBV EOV HASH GP OP DJI SI 
(1): FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LOP, LDJI, LSI) 
1 0.089236 100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
2  0.133510  69.64294  20.10299  0.012666  0.014143  0.042821  0.002420  0.007915  0.000159  0.021659  10.15228 
3  0.174247  69.31781  20.09368  0.084297  0.069088  0.082248  0.008574  0.004690  0.089813  0.132293  10.11750 
4  0.208220  69.21861  20.07800  0.087726  0.063105  0.091891  0.006137  0.003851  0.130538  0.194279  10.12585 
5  0.238292  69.13212  20.07648  0.093821  0.068997  0.098099  0.004751  0.004467  0.153696  0.242479  10.12509 
6  0.265110  69.07429  20.07543  0.098891  0.069911  0.104294  0.004269  0.004888  0.171241  0.272138  10.12463 
7  0.289584  69.04017  20.07283  0.102049  0.070048  0.107904  0.003690  0.005221  0.182453  0.292235  10.12339 
8  0.312142  69.01439  20.07158  0.104564  0.069695  0.110543  0.003311  0.005473  0.190445  0.307239  10.12275 
9  0.333190  68.99426  20.07075  0.106614  0.069345  0.112625  0.003047  0.005651  0.196888  0.318703  10.12211 
10  0.352985  68.97904  20.06981  0.108108  0.068821  0.114341  0.002823  0.005788  0.201978  0.327628  10.12165 
(2): FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LOP, LDJI, LSI, DV) 
1  0.088898  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.0000000 
2  0.133945  72.56927  20.13121  0.041758  8.8E-05  0.098224  0.027560  0.001589  0.000687  0.002292 17.127313 
3  0.175764  72.08224  20.13425  0.148067  0.034699  0.244634  0.017965  0.081727  0.122574  0.031775  17.102061 
4  0.208055  71.73926  20.10767  0.289199  0.034402  0.381936  0.029360  0.123798  0.144773  0.075313  17.074290 
5  0.237772  71.19855  20.217509  0.322583  0.032966  0.647179  0.022938  0.127155  0.139636  0.215343  17.076146 
6  0.263958  70.90378  20.290786  0.336065  0.046484  0.709422  0.019024  0.136528  0.172126  0.316877  17.068907 
7  0.288247  70.70841  20.360593  0.333563  0.079187  0.730169  0.015955  0.137717  0.184304  0.375281  17.074816 
8  0.310877  70.57716  20.401228  0.330260  0.120080  0.722513  0.013992  0.144631  0.194569  0.419226  17.076343 
9  0.332613  70.42705 2 0.440570  0.343948  0.162169  0.723344  0.013478  0.146085  0.200372  0.461578  17.081402 
10  0.353263  70.29720  20.481974  0.350348  0.201365  0.724066  0.012238  0.149376  0.210477  0.488857  17.084102 
(3): FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LOP, LDJI, LSI, DV’) 
1  0.087395  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
2  0.130853  74.35845  25.00083  0.169084  0.063336  0.249291  0.056673  5.73E-05  0.015324  0.003965  10.08298 
3  0.170888  74.07583  25.08213  0.210320  0.151004  0.260412  0.067889  0.071403  0.009058  0.013847  10.05810 
4  0.200639  73.91041  25.06713  0.208223  0.140833  0.232576  0.149281  0.114483  0.080100  0.046427  10.05053 
5  0.228146  73.36040  25.05225  0.334346  0.171296  0.384731  0.198527  0.116988  0.070455  0.209062  10.10193 
6  0.251440  72.85983  25.05138  0.483718  0.211823  0.461448  0.248267  0.096316  0.075465  0.401673  10.11008 
7  0.272403  72.41273  25.07048  0.585694  0.414078  0.473728  0.263102  0.097604  0.065593  0.506023  10.11096 
8  0.292613  71.84532  25.11079  0.536605  0.866225  0.467039  0.267483  0.109727  0.058930  0.607852  10.13001 
9  0.312471  71.23209  25.16030  0.483560  1.349822  0.463842  0.254317  0.124232  0.055452  0.733107  10.14327 
10  0.332569  70.60522  25.19070  0.429863  1.850939  0.469308  0.239178  0.156563  0.053518  0.849822  10.15488 
Notes: DV’: The closing of the Road Silk by FBI, which amounts 1 from 23/10/2013 and 0 otherwise. 
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Figure A-6: Impulse Response Function 
(1): FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LOP, LDJI, LSI) 
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(2): FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LOP, LDJI, LSI, DV) 
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(3): FBPI (LBPI/LTTR, LETR, LMBV, LEOV, LHASH, LGP, LOP, LDJI, LSI, DV’) 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: DV’: The closing of the Road Silk by FBI, which amounts 1 from 23/10/2013 and 0 otherwise. 
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